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COMMENT 
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS AND MARYLAND'S 
DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY STATUTE: A 
STUDY OF THE MECHANICS OF MARYLAND'S 
STATUTORY CORPORATE LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Characteristic of nonprofit corporations and organizations ("non-
profits")' is the unique legal relationships which exjst among members, 
managers and third parties that deal with this type of corporate entity. 
Although nonprofits resemble business corporations because they are 
typically incorporated under state statutes and managed by officers and 
directors,2 nonprofit organizations are prohibited from distributing prof-
its to their members. 3 This nondistribution constraint is for the benefit of 
the association's patrons,4 and may obligate the managers of nonprofits 
1. For the purposes of this article "nonprofit corporation" is synonymous with "not-
for-profit corporation" and "nonstock corporation." For a discussion of the lack of 
any substantive distinction between the terms "nonprofit" and "not-for-profit," see 
H. 0LECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 17-
20 (4th ed. 1980). Professor Oleck points out that while there are a few nonprofit 
corporations remaining that have outstanding stock, the large majority of nonprofit 
corporations issue certificates of membership and are therefore nonstock corpora-
tions. /d. at 47. The Corporations and Associations article of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code refers to "Nonstock Corporations" rather than "nonprofits." MD. 
CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 5-201 -208 (1985). Because the terms are virtually 
synonymous, "nonprofit" will be used in this article since it is a more widely recog-
nized term. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. 
REV. 497, 501 n.3 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits]. 
2. See generally Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) 
[hereinafter Hansmann, Role of Nonprofits]. A nonprofit may be organized as an 
unincorporated association, but the law is not well defined in this area and personal 
liability may be greater than that for managers of incorporated nonprofits. K. 
HOFFMAN, R. LARKIN & K. LUNDEEN, "NOT FOR PROFIT" ORGANIZATIONS 111-
15 (MICPEL 1986) [hereinafter K. HOFFMAN]. 
3. SeeK. HoFFMAN, supra note 2, at 111-12; Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra 
note 1, at 501-02; Hansmann, Role of Nonprofits, supra note 2, at 838. Professor 
Hansmann labels the prohibition on distribution of profits the "nondistribution con-
straint." Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 501-02. As he explains, 
notiprofits are permitted to earn a profit after payment of reasonable compensation 
to the managers of the organization, but the profits must be used for association 
purposes, not for the pecuniary gain of the members. /d. 
Historically, state statutes also imposed constraints on nonprofit corporations 
by limiting the purposes for which the association could be operated. Hansmann, 
Role of Nonprofits, supra note 2, at 840. Today, many states, including Maryland, 
do not regulate the purposes of non profits. Because tax exempt status is one of the 
primary purposes of qualifying as a nonprofit, nonprofit regulation has been left up 
to the Internal Revenue Service. With the exception of the nondistribution con-
straint and the possible purpose limitation, incorporated associations are otherwise 
regulated by general corporation statutes. /d.; see also MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE 
ANN. § 5-201 (1985). 
4. Patrons are the customers, donors and beneficiaries of nonprofits. See Hansmann, 
Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 606-09. 
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to act for the patron's benefit. 5 Managers of business corporations, on 
the other hand, are obligated to protect the shareholders of the corpora-
tions and may be only indirectly responsible to business patrons for a 
breach of their duty to use reasonable care in making business 
judgments. 6 
Because of the differences between nonprofit corporations and busi-
ness corporations, courts and commentators have applied and advocated 
several different theories for judging the standard of care for officers and 
directors of nonprofits. 7 For example, some nonprofit charitable organi-
zations are almost functionally identical to charitable trusts, and are 
therefore particularly amenable to the application of trust laws. 8 Con-
versely, other nonprofits bear little resemblance to charitable trusts and 
are closer in operation to business corporations.9 
All nonprofits, however, may be accurately described by the "trust 
model," of corporate theory10 which holds that officers and directors are 
analogous to trustees employed to preserve the fund and manage the as-
sets with the same care that they would use in managing their own prop-
5. /d. Professor Hansmann notes that courts generally have denied patrons standing 
to sue officers and directors of non profits for breaches of fiduciary duty. /d. at 606. 
He argues, however, that courts should grant standing for patrons because those 
with standing (the Attorney General and the Internal Revenue Service) rarely en-
force private charter restraints except for their own benefit or when it is in the pub-
lic interest. /d. at 600-06. A court may permit "patron" standing provided that the 
patron has a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the case to be considered 
a real party in interest. Therefore, it is advantageous for officers and directors of 
nonprofits to exercise their judgment with the patrons' interests in mind. 
6. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A 
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of share-
holders."); see also Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 568. Manag-
ers of business corporations may be indirectly responsible for decisions regarding 
the protection of business patrons when, for example, they make uninformed busi-
ness decisions to market and sell unreasonably dangerous products. If the decision 
dilutes a shareholder's interest (e.g., where stock is rendered worthless after the 
corporation is forced into bankruptcy because of consumer tort judgments), the 
shareholder may have a cause of action against the officers and directors based on 
their breach of duty to make only informed business judgments. Cf Solomon & 
Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model For the Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity Debate, 12 J. CORP. L. 331, 332-37 (1987) (describing the three corporate social 
responsibility models). 
7. See Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE 
L. REV. 389, 391-93, 399-403 (1987). 
8. See Pasley, Non-profit Corporations-Accountability of Directors and Officers, 21 
Bus. LAW. 621, 637 (1966); Fishman, supra note 7, at 401-03. · 
9. Cooperatives, for example, are not organized for profit but result in financial benefit 
to their members. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note I, at 508, 587-
99. Furthermore, many of the modem nonprofit cooperatives are large, complex 
entities. Such complexity requires the officers and directors of these cooperatives to 
delegate many of their duties. Trustees of a charitable trust, however, typically are 
not permitted to delegate their management responsibilities. See Fishman, supra 
note 7, at 402 n.46-47. 
10. See Baysinger & Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project 
and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 439-42 (1985). 
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erty. 11 In contrast, business corporations may be described by the 
"contract model" of the corporation, 12 which holds that officers and di-
rectors are employed to maximize profits through shrewd business ma-
neuvers, using the same care an "ordinarily prudent person reasonably 
would be expected to exercise in a like position . . . under similar 
circumstances." 13 
The dilemma of which model theory to apply to non profits, and the 
question of whether to apply the law of trusts, traditional corporation 
law or law created specifically for nonprofits, has culminated in states 
adopting several different types of statutes: 1) statutes with separate pro-
visions for business corporations and non profits; 14 2) statutes applying to 
all corporations generally; 15 and 3) statutes with provisions applying to 
all corporations generally followed by special provisions for particular 
types of corporations such as nonprofits, close corporations and foreign 
corporations. 16 Maryland's law is of the latter type: Titles 1 through 3, 
the "Maryland General Corporation Law," 17 are followed by provisions 
for specific classes of organizations in Titles 4 through 7. 18 
In 1988, the Maryland General Assembly followed the lead of Dela-
ware19 and adopted a provision in the Maryland General Corporation 
Law which enables the stockholders of a corporation to determine the 
limits of liability of its officers and directors to the corporation and its 
stockholders.20 Although designed primarily with the interests of busi-
ness corporations in mind, 21 the structure of Maryland's new statute may 
be such that the liability limiting provision is applicable to nonprofits as 
well as to business corporations.22 Limiting the liability of officers and 
11. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 401-03. 
12. See Butler & Ribstein, Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the New Maryland 
Officer-Director Liability Provisions, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. [ ], [] (1989). 
13. Fishman, supra note 7, at 399. 
14. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989). 
15. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8 (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
16. See, e.g., Mo. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN.§§ 1-101 to 7-305 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
17. See id. § 1-103 (Supp. 1988). 
18. /d. Title 4 of the Corporations and Associations article is entitled "Close Corpora-
tions," Title 5 "Special Types of Corporations," Title 6 "Regulated Finance and 
Insurance Corporations" and Title 7 "Foreign Corporations." 
19. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). 
20. Act of Feb. 18, 1988, ch. 3 & 4, 1988 Md. Laws 740-41, 746-47 (codified at Mo. 
CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988)). 
21. The liability limiting statute was enacted to dissuade Maryland business corpora-
tions from reincorporating in states which previously had enacted similar types of 
statutes. See Hanks & Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the Mary-
land Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 235, 242-43 
( 1989); Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute, 
18 U. BALT. L. REV. 278, 279 (1989). 
22. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1-102, 5-201 (1985). Although the direc-
tors and officers liability statute uses the term "stockholders," and nonprofits have 
members rather than stockholders, "stockholder" is defined broadly by the Mary-
land Code to include "a member of a corporation organized without capital stock." 
Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.§§ 1-101(t), 2-405.2 (1985 & Supp. 1988). The 
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directors to the members and the nonprofit corporation by charter 
amendment, however, does not afford the officers and directors the de-
gree of protection it does in the case of business corporations. Specifi-
cally, officers and directors of nonprofits have significant potential 
liability to third parties for damages resulting from mismanagement of 
the corporation, apart from any liability to the members and the 
corporation. 23 
This article analyzes the applicability of the director and officer lia-
bility statute to nonprofits by examining the mechanics of Maryland's 
statutory corporation law. Next, it discusses the arguments regarding 
whether officers and directors of non profits should be afforded such pro-
tection. Finally, this article addresses whether allowing officers and di-
rectors of nonprofits to implement liability limiting provisions is 
indicative of a weakness in the structure of Maryland's corporation law. 
II. THE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR LIABILITY LIMITING 
STATUTE 
Recently enacted section 2-405.2 of the Corporations and Associa-
tions article provides: "The charter of a corporation may include any 
provision expanding or limiting the liability of its directors and officers to 
the corporation or its stockholders for money damages . . . . "24 Section 
2-405.2, however, does not apply in three situations: 1) where the officer 
or director has received an improper benefit or profit; 2) where the of-
ficer's or director's action or inaction was the result of "active and delib-
erate" dishonesty; and 3) where the officer's or director's liability arises 
out of specified banking transactions. 25 The liability limiting statute, 
which is based at least partially on the contractual theory of the corpora-
tion,26 allows the stockholders to determine to what extent the officers 
and directors of their corporation will be held accountable for breach of 
their fiduciary duty.27 Presumably, by limiting the liability of officers 
and directors, stockholders and the corporation will be able to attract 
managers who will not be deterred from taking potential profit-yielding 
effect of the liability limiting provision on other statutes that protect officers and 
directors of nonprofit corporations is discussed infra notes 29-79 and accompanying 
text. 
23. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. 
24. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). 
25. /d. § 2-405.2(b). 
26. See Honabach, Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corporation-A Com-
mentary on Maryland's New Director and Officer Liability Limiting and Indemnifi-
cation Legislation, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 310, 331-46 (1989). 
27. One commentator has argued that charter or by-law amendments that modify the 
duties and liabilities of officers and directors are of little benefit in the nonprofit 
context. See Haller, Directors' Indemnity in Non-Profit Corporations: Should Char-
ity Begin at Home, 11 (April) Bus. LAW. 6-9 (1956). Charter provisions rely on the 
self-interest of shareholders as a check on director action. Members of nonprofits 
do not necessarily have the same self-interest that checks the directors actions. /d. 
at 9. 
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risks out of fear of liability from failure. 28 Therefore, the reasoning goes, 
the stockholders are benefitted as much as the officers and directors by 
the limit of liability. 
III. MECHANICS OF OTHER STATUTES AFFECTING 
NONPROFITS 
Section 1-102(a) of the Corporations and Associations article reads: 
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the provisions of this 
article apply to every Maryland corporation and to all their corporate 
acts."29 The exception to this rule is set forth in section 1-102(d): "To 
the extent that any provision of the Code which relates to a specific class 
of corporations conflicts with a general provision of this article, the spe-
cific provision governs."30 Taken as a whole, section 1-102 requires that 
Title 2, which includes the liability limiting provisions of section 2-405.2, 
apply to all Maryland corporations unless a Code provision relating to a 
specific class of corporations conflicts with a general provision. 
Title 5 of the Corporations and Associations article is entitled "Spe-
cial Types of Corporations," and includes subtitle 2, "Nonstock Corpo-
rations."31 The nonstock corporation subtitle does not repeat all of the 
provisions applicable to corporations generally but rather incorporates 
those provisions by reference.32 Section 5-201 states: 
The provisions of Maryland General Corporation Law apply to 
nonstock corporations unless: 
(1) The context of the provisions clearly requires otherwise; or 
(2) Specific provisions of this subtitle or other subtitles gov-
erning specific classes of corporations provide otherwise. 33 
This section reaffirms that the general provisions of Maryland Corpora-
tions Law embodied in Titles 1 through 3 are applicable to nonprofits. 
The exceptions delineated in subsections (1) and (2), however, are not a 
reiteration of the exception contained in section 1-102{d). Subsection (1) 
of section 5-201, by use of the term "clearly," seems to envision a situa-
tion where tl}e provision of a certain section would be difficult to apply to 
nonprofits or where applying the provision would lead to an absurd re-
sult. Subsection (2) addresses the situation where a statute would specifi-
cally exclude part or parts of the Maryland General Corporation Law 
and is probably limited by its terms to conflicting provisions that appear 
in the Corporations and Associations article. Nowhere in subtitle 5 or 
28. See Hanks & Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the Maryland Di-
rector and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 235, 252 (1989). 
29. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 1-102(a) (1985). 
30. /d. § 1-102(d) (emphasis added). 
31. !d. §§ 5-201 - 208. 
32. See Carter v. Glen Burnie Vol. Fire Co., 292 Md. 165, 167, 438 A.2d 278, 279 
(1981). 
33. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 5-201 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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elsewhere in the Corporation and Association article is there any indica-
tion that the power granted by the liability limiting provisions of section 
2-405.2 should not be available to nonprofits. 
There are, however, two sections of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings article of the Maryland Code which address the liability of of-
ficers and directors of certain types of non profits. 34 Section 5-312 is 
entitled "Personal Liability-Agents of Certain Associations and Orga-
nizations," and provides that agents of certain specified non profits shall 
not be personally liable for damages in any suit if the nonprofit maintains 
insurance for the particular act or omission which is the subject matter of 
the suit; the insurance must meet certain coverage requirements and the 
coverage is the cap on the amount of damages the plaintiff may recover. 35 
Section 5-314 entitled "Same-Volunteer of Charitable Organization," 
provides that a volunteer of a charitable organization will not be liable in 
any suit beyond the limits of any personal insurance the volunteer may 
have for acts or omissions in providing services for the charitable 
organization. 36 
34. Mo. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CoDE ANN. §§ 5-312, 5-314 (Supp. 1988). 
35. Section 5-312 provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Conditions prohibiting the imposition of personal damages.-Except as 
provided in subsection (d) of this section, an agent of an association or 
organization is not personally liable for damages in any suit if: 
(1) The association or organization maintains insurance covering the 
liability incurred by the association or organization or its agents, 
or both, as a result of the acts or omissions of its agents in provid-
ing services or performing duties on behalf of the association or 
organization; 
(2) The terms of the insurance policy under which the insurance is 
maintained provide coverage for the act or omission which is the 
subject matter of the suit and no meritorious basis exists for the 
denial of the coverage by the insurance carrier; and 
(3) The insurance has: 
(i) A limit of coverage of not Jess than $200,000 per individual 
claim, and $500,000 per total claim that arise from the same 
occurrence; and 
(ii) l. If the insurance has a deductible, a deductible amount not 
greater than $10,000 per occurrence; or 
2. If there is coinsurance, a rate of coinsurance of not greater 
than 20 percent. 
(c) Limitation ofrecovery.-ln suits to which the provisions of subsec-
tion (b) of this section apply, the plaintiff may recover damages 
from the association or organization only to the extent of the ap-
plicable limit of insurance coverage including any amount for 
which the association or organization is responsible as a result of 
any deductible or coinsurance provisions of such insurance 
coverage. 
Mo. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312(b), (c) (Supp. 1988). 
36. /d. § 5-314(c). Section 5-313 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings article, which 
is substantially similar in operation to section 5-314, applies to "community recrea-
tion programs." The programs may be incorporated, but section 5-313 gives no 
protection to officers or directors, unless they are also either a referee or umpire at a 
game, or the athletic coach, manager, or program manager. /d. § 5-313(a)(2)-(4). 
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"Agent" in section 5-312 is defined to include officers and direc-
tors, 37 and "volunteer" in section 5-314 is defined to include officers and 
directors performing services without receiving compensation. 38 Conse-
quently, a volunteer officer or director of a charitable organization is pro-
tected by both sections 5-312 and 5-314. 
Because these sections 5-312 and 5-314 of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings article apply only to specified nonprofits, the question arises 
whether these sections are provisions affecting specific classes of corpora-
tions within the meaning of section 1-102(d) or section 5-201 of the Cor-
porations and Associations article which would displace the application 
of the new liability limiting provisions of section 2-405.2. 39 Unfortu-
nately, the Maryland courts have not had an opportunity to shed light on 
this issue.40 Whether sections 5-312 and 5-314 displace section 2-405.2 
of the Corporations and Associations article, therefore, requires resolu-
tion of two subsidiary issues: 1) whether the classes of organizations pro-
tected by sections 5-312 and 5-314 of the Courts and Judicial Proceeding 
article are subject to the provisions of the Corporations and Associations 
article, and 2) whether the protection granted in sections 5-312 and 5-314 
are "specific provisions" within section 1-102( d) that conflict with the 
liability limiting provision of section 2-405.2. 
A. Associations and organizations protected by sections 5-312 
and 5-314 
The liablity protection of section 5-312 is available only to athletic 
clubs, charitable organizations, community associations and homeowners 
associations.41 Similarly, section 5-314 applies only to charitable organi-
zations. 42 Each type of organization listed in section 5-512 or section 5-
314, however, is only a subclass of nonprofit corporations.43 Charitable 
organizations, for example, are the largest subclass targeted by sections 
5-312 and 5-314, yet they only represent a segment of the nonprofits in 
Maryland.44 Therefore, even if sections 5-312 and 5-314 are interpreted 
This comment does not address section 5-313 because it does not expressly apply to 
officers and directors. 
37. /d. § 5-312(a)(7). 
38. /d. § 5-314(a)(4). 
39. Section 1-102(d) of the Corporations and Associations article may be the more im-
portant of the two provisions, because the wording of section 5-201(2) appears to 
exclude only those provisions that conflict with another section in the Corporations 
and Associations article. 
40. Cf Carter v. Glen Burnie Vol. Fire Co., 292 Md. 165, 167, 438 A.2d 278, 279 
(1981) (brief discussion of section 5-201 of the Corporations and Associations 
article). 
41. Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312(a) (Supp. 1988). These corporations 
must be exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c) (1986) to qualify for inclusion 
in section 5-312. 
42. Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-314(a) (Supp. 1988). 
43. See H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 19-21. 
44. A charitable corporation is necessarily a nonprofit, but a nonprofit need not be or-
ganized for charitable purposes. See H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 19. The Corpora-
1989] Nonprofit Organizations and D & 0 Liability 391 
as being in conflict with the liability limiting provisions of section 2-
405.2, the effect would be to make section 2-405.2 unavailable only to the 
enumerated nonprofits. 
It can be argued, however, that sections 1-102 and 5-201 of the Cor-
porations and Associations article only permit displacement of provisions 
of Maryland General Corporation Law when statutes affect whole classes 
of corporations, such as regulated financial corporations, foreign corpo-
rations, close corporations and nonprofits, and not when statutes affect 
only subclasses of corporations.45 There is no support in the statutory 
scheme of the Corporations and Associations article for distinguishing 
corporations in smaller classes than the classes recognized in the Code. 46 
Section 5-201(2) of the Corporations and Associations Code supports 
this argument because it provides for the displacement of statutes only 
when specific provisions of "subtitles governing specific classes of corpo-
rations provide otherwise."47 Further, the term "specific class" as used 
in section 1-102 of the Corporations and Associations article can be con-
strued synonymously with "specific class" as used in section 5-201. It 
can be concluded, therefore, that a "specific class" of corporations is one 
that is governed by either a title or a subtitle. 48 
B. "Specific provisions" and the conflict with section 2-405.2 
In addition to the fact that sections 5-312 and 5-314 of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings article apply only to certain nonprofits,49 the 
liability limiting provisions of these sections are different in nature than 
the liability limiting provisions of section 2-405.2. This difference is illus-
trated by the class of individuals that are protected from liability as well 
as the types of actions to which these protections apply. First, sections 5-
312 and 5-314 protect a broader spectrum of individuals than does sec-
tion 2-405.2. The term "agent" in section 5-312 is defined to include all 
employees of an organization, and in section 5-314 to include all those 
tions and Associations article does not further classify corporations beyond the class 
of nonstock corporations. See Mn. CORPS. & Ass'Ns ConE ANN. §§ 5-201 - 208 
(1985). 
45. Although nonprofits are one class of corporation, the organizations mentioned in 
sections 5-312 and 5-314 are subclasses of nonprofits. Title 5 of the Corporations 
and Associations Code does not distinguish between the various types of nonstock 
corporations. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5-201 - 208 (1985). 
46. Cf Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note I, at 580-86. Professor Hansmann 
comments that the development of statutes in some states that address various sub-
classes of nonprofits "though understandable, is unfortunate." /d. at 580. 
47. Mn. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns ConE ANN. § 5-201(2) (1985) (emphasis added). 
48. This interpretation is also supported by construing section 5-201 as a "specific pro-
vision" within the meaning of section 1-102(d). Both sections 1-102 and 5-201 are 
conflicts provisions. Because section 5-201 is a more specific conflicts provision than 
section 1-102, by the terms of section 1-102 if section 5-201 conflicts with section 1-
102, section 5-201 should apply, not section 1-102. Compare MD. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns 
ConE ANN. § 1-102(d) (1985) with Mn. CoRPS. & Ass'NS ConE ANN. § 5-201 
(1985). 
49. See supra notes 41-44. 
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providing services for the corporation without receiving compensation. 50 
The rationale for protecting the employees of certain nonprofits from 
civil liability is similar to the rationale supporting the other protective 
provisions in subtitle 3 of title 5 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Code. Subtitle 3 is entitled "Limitations and Prohibited Actions" and 
includes provisions such as immunity from liability for emergency medi-
cal care. 51 Like sections 5-312 and 5-314, all the actions excluded or 
liabilities limited in subtitle 3 appear to be mandates of public policy. 
Specifically, sections 5-312 and 5-314 appear to codify the belief that no 
one working for a charitable or benevolent organization, especially those 
doing so on a volunteer basis, should be personally liable for acts or 
omissions while performing their work. 52 Therefore, sections 5-312 and 
5-314 protect officers and directors only as an incident to protecting all 
employees. 53 
In contrast, section 2-405.2 of the Corporations and Associations 
article is part of a subtitle 2, which enumerates all the powers, duties and 
liabilities of officers and directors. The provisions of section 2-405.2 are 
aimed specifically at officers and directors of business corporations. 54 
Furthermore, one of the rationales upon which section 2-405.2 is based is 
that corporations are the manifestation of a contractual relationship be-
tween stockholders and the officers and directors. 55 Consequently, the 
stockholders have a self-interest in determining the extent to which of-
ficers and directors will be held personally liable for breach of their fidu-
ciary duty to the corporation.56 Section 2-405.2 is therefore unique to 
officers and directors. 
Second, sections 5-312 and 5-314 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings article provide broader protection than section 2-405.2 of the 
Corporations and Associations article. Section 5-312 limits the liability 
of an agent if the conditions of subsection (b) are met .57 In order to limit 
officer and director liability, the organization must have an officer and 
director liability policy that covers the particular act or omission which 
is the subject matter of the suit. 58 Pursuant to subsection (b), agents 
50. MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN.§§ 5-312(a)(7), 5-314(a) (Supp. 1988). 
51. /d. § 5-309. . 
52. All of the special exemptive provisions are inapplicable in cases where the individual 
is guilty of "willful, wanton, or grossly negligent" acts or omissions to act. See, e.g., 
MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-312(d), 5-314(c) (Supp. 1988). 
53. See id. §§ 5-312(b), 5-314(c) (Supp. 1988). 
54. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). 
55. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
56. See Honabach, supra note 26, at 324; see also Haller, supra note 27, at 9. But cf 
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 608-11 (discussing patron stand-
ing to sue nonprofits). 
57. MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 5-312(b) (Supp. 1988). 
58. Lloyd's standard policy for directors and officers has two parts: the first part insures 
the company for any indemnification it provides to a director or officer; the second 
part provides direct coverage for individual directors. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ameri-
can Home Assurance Co., 584 F. Supp. 1245, 1247 (D. Mass. 1984); see also Kurtz 
& Goodman, Duties and Liabilities of Directors and Officers of Charitable Organiza-
1989] Nonprofit Organizations and D & 0 Liability 393 
generally can be protected against damages arising from any suit if there 
is insurance protecting against the particular act or omission. The only 
exception to this liability protection is that the agent will be personally 
liable to the extent the judgment for damages exceeds the limits of any 
insurance in cases where it is found that the agent acted with malice or 
gross negligence. 59 In short, when the conditions of subsection (b) of 
section 5-312 are met, and the agent is not found to have acted with 
malice or gross negligence, an agent is protected from personal liability 
from any private plaintiff. 
The protection afforded under section 5-312 is significant because 
the officers and directors of charitable organizations have potential liabil-
ity for mismanagement to the corporation,60 members,61 patrons,62 bene-
ficiaries, 63 the Internal Revenue Service64 and the Attorney General. 65 
With the exception of the Attorney General, section 5-312 limits the po-
tential recovery by a plaintiff to the limit of the nonprofit's insurance 
coverage, including any deductible the organization would have to pay.66 
Section 5-314 differs from section 5-312 because it does not require 
an officer or director to take affirmative action to claim the protection of 
the section. 67 Although section 5-314 protects only uncompensated of-
ficers and directors, the protection is broad. Subsection (b) of section 5-
314 provides: 
(b) Liability of Volunteers.-A volunteer is not liable in dam-
tions, in NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 230 (J. Small ed. 1984) ("Legally, insurance 
may provide more protection for directors than indemnification statutes."). Non-
profit director and officer insurance is more readily available and lower priced than 
similar insurance for business corporations. "Insurance may be available for as little 
as $600 a year for $1,000,000 worth of coverage; it commonly runs $2000- $5000 
for that amount of coverage." /d.; cf Sargent, supra note 21, at 290-95 (discussing 
difficulty in obtaining director and officer liability insurance). 
59. Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312(d) (Supp. 1988). 
60. See, e.g., Berger v. Amana Society, 253 Iowa 378, Ill N.W.2d 753 (1961). See also 
supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
61. See, e.g., Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859 (lOth Cir. 
1948). Members of nonprofits, however, have been granted statutory standing 
to bring suit in only a few states. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. 
LAW §§ 623(a), 720(b)(3) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§§ 5420(b), 7710 (West Supp. 1989). 
62. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note l, at 606-ll. 
63. See Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977). But cf George Pepperdine Found. 
v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal. App. 2d. 154, 271 P.2d 600 (1954) (holding that only the 
Attorney General could bring an action in the name of the Foundation). The Pep-
perdine case, however, never appeared to reflect law outside of California and was 
overruled by Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 
750, 757, 394 P.2d 932, 937, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249 (1964). 
64. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note l, at 601-06. 
65. /d. at 600-01. The risk of liability to these parties, however, is in reality rather slim. 
See id. 
66. Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-312 (Supp. 1988); see also supra note 35. 
67. Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-314(b), (c) (Supp. 1988) (liability limited 
to any personal insurance the volunteer has, which may be nothing). 
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ages beyond the limits of any personal insurance the volun-
teer may have in any suit that arises fro~ the actions or 
omissions of any of the officers, employees, trustees, or 
other volunteers of the charitable organization for which 
the volunteer performs services, unless: 
(1) The volunteer knew or should have known of an action 
or omission of a particular officer, employee, trustee, or 
other volunteer, and the volunteer authorizes, ap-
proves, or otherwise actively participates in that action 
or omission; or 
(2) After an action or omission of a particular officer, em-
ployee, trustee or other volunteer, the volunteer, with 
full knowledge of that action or omission, ratifies it.68 
The language of subsection (b) creates some doubt as to whether a volun-
teer officer or director would be protected from liability for mismanage-
ment by this section. Subsection (b) is only a protection against vicarious 
liability from the actions or omissions of another volunteer. Subsection 
(c), however, gives a volunteer protection from liability arising out of his 
or her own actions or omissions. Section 5-314(c) provides: 
(c) When volunteer liable.-A volunteer is not liable in dam-
ages beyond the limits of any personal insurance the volun-
teer may have in any suit that arises from the volunteer's 
actions or omissions in connection with any services that 
the volunteer performs for the charitable organization, un-
less an action or omission of the volunteer constitutes reck-
less, willful, or wanton misconduct or intentionally tortious 
conduct.69 
By virtue of this statute, a volunteer officer or director of a .charitable 
organization is not personally liable for any damages beyond the limits of 
the individual's personal insurance unless the conduct is willful, wanton, 
reckless or intentional. Literally, section 5-314(c) provides that if the 
volunteer officer or director has no insurance the "limits of any insurance 
the volunteer may have" would be zero, and the plaintiff would not be 
able to recover anything from the volunteer.70 Section 2-405.2, on the 
other hand, is a focused provision containing specific protection. To in-
voke the protections of section 2-405.2, the stockholders must agree to 
what extent they desire to limit the liability of the officers and directors 
68. /d. § 5-314(b). 
69. !d. § 5-314(c). 
70. Section 5-312 supports the argument that if there is no insurance under section 5-
314 then there is no liability. Section 5-312 delineates the minimal insurance cover-
age that is required to invoke the protectioa of that section; if the legislature had 
intended that there be a minimal insurance coverage under section 5-314 they would 
have specified it. Compare id. § 5-312(b)(3) with id. § 5-314(c). Although this inter-
pretation may result in discouraging volunteers of charitable organizations from ob-
taining personal liability insurance, it is supported by the plain language of the 
statute. 
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and then amend the corporate charter to reflect the agreement.7 1 The 
effect of such a charter provision is that the corporation or stockholders 
will not be entitled to recovery from the officers or directors for misman-
agement of the corporation unless the officer or director's behavior is of a 
type enumerated in section 2-405.2 for which the liability may not be 
limited. Section 2-405.2, however, does not protect officers and directors 
from liability to parties other than the corporation and stockholders. 72 
Nevertheless, a comparison of section 2-405.2 of the Corporations 
and Associations article with sections 5-312 and 5-314 of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings article reveals a potential for overlapping protection 
for officers and directors of certain nonprofit organizations. Overlapping 
protection, however, is not necessarily sufficient to render section 2-405.2 
inapplicable to the nonprofits that could take advantage of both types of 
protection. Sections 1-102 and 5-201 provide that the liability limiting 
protections of section 2-405.2 will be inapplicable to nonprofits only if 
there are conflicting nonprofit statutes, rather than overlapping nonprofit 
statutes. 73 Similiarly, there also is a valid argument that section 5-312, 
by applying to a subclass of nonprofit corporations, is not the type of 
statute that applies to a "specific class" of corporation within the mean-
ing of section 1-102 or section 5-201.74 This argument is stronger in the 
case of section 5-314 because that section only applies to volunteer agents 
of charitable organizations. 75 Because many officers and directors of 
charitable organizations receive reasonable compensation, they are not 
volunteers, and therefore are beyond the protection of section 5-314.76 
Furthermore, it can be argued that sections 5-312 and 5-314 are 
more general provisions than section 2-405.2 because they protect indi-
viduals other than officers and directors against more potential plaintiffs 
and suits. 77 
It appears that sections 5-312 and 5-314 were created primarily with 
the intention of protecting employees or volunteers of certain non profits 
from third party tort liability. Protection against actions by the members 
of the corporation for mismanagement, however, may be an unintended 
by-product of the broad language needed to create the protection from 
tort liability. Section 2-405.2, on the other hand, is very different in na-
ture because it protects specific individuals from actions by plaintiffs in 
71. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988); cf Honabach, supra 
note 26, at 339 (contending that officers and directors in some corporations actually 
control the corporate charter). 
72. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
74 .. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
75. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
76. Officers and directors of charitable organizations can receive reasonable remunera-
tion for their services without causing the organization to lose its tax exempt status. 
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). 
77. Sections 5-312 and 5-314 are more specific than section 2-405.2 only in that they 
apply to certain types of organizations rather than to all corporations generally. See 
supra notes 49-72 and accompanying text. 
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contractual privity with the corporation for breach of specific duties 
which are implicit terms of their contract. 78 This leads to the conclusion 
that sections 5-312 and 5-314 are not specific provisions which would 
cause the provisions of section 2-405.2 to be inapplicable to nonprofits. 
The inference to be drawn from sections 1-102 and 5-201 is that for 
Maryland General Corporation Law to be inapplicable, not only must 
there be a provision applying to a specific class of corporation, but the 
provision must also deal with the same narrow subject that is addressed 
in the Maryland General Corporation Law.79 Although there is some 
degree of overlap among sections 5-312 and 5-314 of the Courts and Ju-
dicial Proceedings article and section 2-405.2 of the Corporations and 
Associations article for certain corporations, the different rationales be-
hind the sections, the different individuals that they effect and the differ-
ent ways in which they effect them all indicate that the nature of sections 
5-312 and 5-314 differs from that of section 2-405.2. 
IV. SHOULD MARYLAND'S NEW OFFICER AND DIRECTOR 
LIABILITY STATUTE APPLY TO NONPROFITS? 
A. Application of Section 2-405.2 
Not everyone would agree that nonprofits should be able to adopt 
charter provisions to limit the liability of their officers and directors. 80 
Opponents of limiting the liability of officers and directors of nonprofits 
argue that although there has never been a clearly defined standard of 
duty owed by officers and directors of nonprofits, 81 the uniqueness of 
nonprofits dictates that their officers and directors should be held to a 
higher fiduciary duty than officers and directors of business corpora-
tions. 82 In addition, there is support for the argument that if the liability 
of the officers and directors is to be limited in some manner, achieving 
this by a charter provision is not appropriate because the relationship 
between a nonprofit corporation and its members cannot be character-
ized as contractual in the same manner as the relationship between the 
corporation and the shareholders of some business corporations. The 
stockholders of a business corporation have a self interest in assuring the 
corporation is run in the most efficient and profitable manner. This self 
interest, however, is lacking in the case of nonprofits. Accordingly, a 
reduction in the risk of liability for officers and directors of nonprofits 
78. See Sargent, supra note 21, at 288-89. 
79. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
80. See Haller, supra note 27, at 9; Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 
568-73. 
81. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'1 Training School for Deaconesses and 
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D. D.C. 1974) (court noted that the charita-
ble corporation was "a relatively new legal entity" and discussed the different stan-
dards of care for trustees and business directors); see also Fishman, supra note 7, at 
413. 
82. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 568-73. 
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would remove one of the only effective checks on their actions. 83 
Conversely, other commentators do not object to reducing the liabil-
ity of officers and directors of non profits. 84 These commentators argue 
that directors and officers of nonprofits are providing a public service, 
receive less compensation than their counterparts at business corpora-
tions and often work on a volunteer basis. 85 If the officers and directors 
of non profits are required to risk liability for monetary damages because 
of a heightened fiduciary duty, the difficulty of finding qualified prospec-
tive officers and directors would be dramatically increased. 86 Section 2-
405.2, therefore, offers much deserved protection to the officers and di-
rectors of nonprofits. 
B. Application of Section 2-405.1 
The debate over the fiduciary duties of officers and directors of non-
profits has arisen from the lack of a settled body of law that defines the 
responsibilities imposed on officers and directors of non profits. 87 It is 
settled that business officers and directors can be found liable for breach 
of their fiduciary duties if they are guilty of "gross negligence."88 A 
more stringent standard has been imposed upon trustees, who are liable 
for simple negligence. 89 Both of these standards have at one time or an-
83. See Haller, supra note 27, at 9; Fishman, supra note 7, at 408-09. Professor Fish-
man explains that "[m]arket constraints are less efficient in the nonprofit area. 
There are no shareholders who could switch to other investments. Consumer de-
mand may not correlate to quality. Patrons may have neither the capacity, the 
interest, nor the power under nonprofit corporate law to police the organization and 
its managers." Id.; see also Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 568-
69. 
84. See H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 611-13. 
85. /d. "The compensation of a director (or officer) is irrelevant in assessing the fairness 
of directors and officers liability so long as the rules for imposing liability are not 
amended ex post to impose personal liability for behavior which before hand was 
satisfactory. An individual who accepts a corporate position does so knowing both 
the compensation and the responsibility .... Having freely made the decision to 
serve, he cannot complain that the threat of liability is onerous or unfair." 
Honabach, supra note 26, at 319. If Professor Honabach's position is to be believed, 
it would follow that those creating the standard of conduct should not be influenced 
by the compensation normally received at a certain position when creating the stan-
dard and should base their formulation strictly on the function of the entity. 
86. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Olson, 346 Mass. 190, 198, 191 N.E.2d 132, 137 
(1963) (court was influenced in its decision not to remove the trustees of a corpora-
tion for a lapse in judgement by the fact that if they were removed "few if any ... 
would undertake to act as trustees."); see also Note, Fiduciary Duty of a Director of 
a Nonprofit Charitable Corporation Under D.C. Nonprofit Corporation Act is Similar 
to Duty Imposed Upon a Director of a Business Corporation, 24 CATH. U. OF AM. L. 
REV. 657, 660 (1975). 
87. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. 
88. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Stern v. Lucy Webb 
Hayes Nat'! Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 
1013 (D. D.C. 1974). 
89. See Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibil-
ity, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 435 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 379, 
comment a (1959). 
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other been applied to nonprofits by the courts.90 The decision as to 
which standard to apply, however, has now been settled in many states 
by statute.91 Maryland, for example, applies the same "gross negligence" 
standard to both non profits and business corporations. 92 This result, 
once again, stems from the structure of Maryland's statutory corporate 
law.93 
Some commentators, however, have adopted a compromise position 
in the conflict between the corporate form and the more trust-like func-
tion of non profits. These commentators have suggested that the standard 
for officers and directors of nonprofits should be more stringent than for 
business officers and directors, yet somewhat less stringent than that of a 
trustee. 94 Because of the various forms and functions within the class of 
nonprofits, some states have followed this approach and have adopted 
statutes creating different standards for different types of non profits. 95 
Along the same lines, the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, while 
adopting the business corporation standard, also suggests consideration 
of the type of nonprofit corporation and its objective in determining 
whether the officer or director breached the standard.96 
Even those who espouse a lesser standard for nonprofits, however, 
do not suggest that the standard should be lower than the business stan-
dard. Arguments that the lesser standard should apply are refuted not 
only by the fact that the nonprofit managers are analogous to trustees but 
also by the lack of shareholder oversight of the nonprofit's operation. 
Professor Fishman persuasively articulates the need for constraints on 
those who run nonprofits: 
The corporate standard works well in the for-profit sector. The 
financial interests of the shareholders, the efficiency of markets, 
governmental monitoring of corporate activity in public com-
panies, an active plaintiff's bar, and internal mechanisms en-
courage compliance. Weaknesses in the mechanisms available 
for policing the managers of nonprofit corporations argue for a 
stronger, clearer rule of fiduciary conduct for the director of the 
nonprofit corporation than for the director of the business cor-
90. See, e.g., Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013 (court applied the business standard); Beard v. 
Achenbach Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859 (lOth Cir. 1948) (court assumed 
without discussion that the business standard should apply). 
91. See, e.g., Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN.§ 2-405.1 (1985). 
92. /d. 
93. The reasoning supporting the application of section 2-405.1 to non profits is identical 
to the reasoning behind section 2-405.2's application to nonprofits. Titles 1 through 
3 of the Corporations and Associations article apply to all Maryland corporations. 
Accordingly, section 2-405.1, which contains the "gross negligence" standard for 
corporate officers and directors, applies to business corporations and nonprofits 
alike. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
94. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofits, supra note 1, at 569-73. 
95. See id. at 573-74, 581-99. 
96. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30, official comment 2, at 214-16 
(1988). 
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poration. Because self-enforcement mechanisms may be com-
pletely lacking in the nonprofit world, the corporate standard 
of the director'~ duty of care should not be applied in all 
situations. 97 
399 
This argument that section 2-405.1, at least in some situations, is too 
lenient a standard for managers of nonprofits overlaps into the argument 
that the existing fiduciary duty should not be subject to further 
reduction. 
C. The "rhetoric of contract" 
The drafters of the new directors and officers liability statute suggest 
that the statute is based on the contract theory of the corporation. 98 
They reason that the statute permits a trade-off whereby the shareholders 
are entitled to reduce the liability of their officers and directors in ex-
change for managers who are not deterred by the fear of liability from 
taking the risks necessary to make a business successful.99 Under this 
arrangement, the drafters opine, it is actually the shareholders who are 
benefitted by the new statute. 100 While this may be appropriate and even 
desirable in the case of business corporations, 101 it may be inappropriate 
when applied to nonprofit corporations for several reasons. 
The first indication that section 2-405.2 is inappropriate for nonprof-
its lies in the fact that the contract model of corporations is not readily 
compatible with nonprofits. Not all scholars agree that the "rhetoric of 
contract" should be applied to "matters of corporate governance" even 
in the case ofbusiness corporations. 102 For example, traditional corpora-
tion scholars prefer the trust model of the corporation. Professor 
Honabach summarizes the traditionalists' argument in the following 
passage: 
[T]raditionalists contend that corporate managers, like their 
trustee counterparts, actually establish and implement all cor-
porate policies. Formal organizational rules placing sharehold-
ers at the base of the corporate power pyramid matter ·little, 
because management's control of the proxy machinery enables 
it to maintain control and dictate corporate action. Share-
holder action or inaction, traditionalist argue, is not an expres-
sion of shareholder will; it merely echoes the interests of those 
97. Fishman, supra note 7, at 413-14 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
98. Honabach, supra note 26, at 331. 
99. Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 21, at 247-48. 
100. /.d. . 
101. See Sargent, supra note 21. Presumably, Professor Sargent's two cheers out of a 
possible three voices an overall approval of the director and officer liability statute. 
Professor Honabach concludes that the new statute is "justified" when applied to 
open corporations, but that its application to closed corporations cannot be justified 
because of the breakdown of the contract theory of the corporation in the case of 
closed corporations. /d: at 344"46. 
102. See Honabach, sup,r_a note 26. 
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corporate managers who control the medium of shareholder ex-
pression. The appearance that shareholders determine corpo-
rate policy and practice, traditionalists maintain, is nothing 
more than a clever illusion. 103 
Because the contract model of the corporation has been rejected by tradi-
tionalists and may not be accepted by contract theorists in the case of all 
business corporations, 104 it is probable that both schools of thought 
would reject the contract model as a valid description of nonprofits. 
A second indication that the application of section 2-405.2 to non-
profits is inappropriate is that many nonprofits are very close in their 
function to a trust making the trust model a more appropriate descrip-
tion.105 Furthermore, the members of nonprofits lack the same financial 
self-interest in the efficient management of the corporation that exists in 
business corporations. 106 Even though it is argued that managers of busi-
ness corporations really control the corporation through proxy, 107 there 
is a very real interest of shareholders of a business corporation in assur-
ing that their directors and officers act prudently. 
Finally, the rationale that section 2-405.2 will enure to the benefit of 
shareholders is unpersuasive in the case of nonprofits where the members 
stand to receive no financial reward for the success of the corporation. 
Accordingly, if the contract theory of corporations is the primary justifi-
cation for the new statute, its application to nonprofits is unjustified. 
The question thus arises whether the fact that the new director and 
officer liability statute is justifiable only in the case of some business cor-
porations 108 and not justifiable at all in the case of non profits is indicative 
of a flaw in Maryland's corporate law structure. Professor Honabach 
concludes that the drafters of the new legislation should have excluded 
close corporations from its scope. 109 
If the basis of whether the statute should apply to a particular type 
of corporation is determined by the applicability of contract principles of 
the corporation, nonprofits should be excluded along with close corpora-
tions. As Professor Honabach points out, however, the pitfalls of this 
approach are that the legislature, by giving special preference in the stat-
ute to one type of corporation, would have to consider all the special 
types of corporations. 110 To make exclusions for each class of corpora-
103. /d. at 332 (footnotes omitted). 
104. Professor Honabach rejects the contract theory in regard to close corporations and 
intimates that contract theorists may have the same opinion. See Honabach, supra 
note 26, at 344-46. 
105. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra notes 27, 83 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
108. See Honabach, supra note 26, at 331-46. 
109. /d. at 346-51. It is ironic that Professor Honabach criticizes the drafters for not 
excluding close corporations from the scope of section 2-405.2, yet fails to consider 
that the contract model of a corporation is even less descriptive of nonprofits. 
110. The new statute does not apply to banking organizations which are specifically ex-
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tion whenever a particular statute is not perfectly suited to all corpora-
tions generally would result in long and perhaps complex provisions. 
Failure to make express exclusions on a class by class basis, however, 
results in the application of potentially inappropriate statutes to all 
corporations. 111 
The alternative is to adopt exclusions as part of the particular subti-
tle or title governing the particular type of organization. In fact, the 
Corporations and Associations article already envisions this solution. 112 
Maryland corporate law mandates that when the Maryland General Cor-
porate Law is amended, due consideration is to be given to the applica-
tion of such a provision to all types of corporations. This provision is 
included so that the legislature can exclude a statute that is not in har-
mony with the title or subtitle governing that particular type of 
corporation. 
It is possible that the legislature and drafters did consider the appli-
cation of section 2-405.2 to the various classes of corporations and con-
cluded the problems raised were not of significant import to warrant 
action. If this scenario is accurate, more scrutiny should be given to the 
effect of new provisions on the various types of corporations so that the 
structure of the Corporations and Associations article is not defeated by 
certain types of corporations being affected by inappropriate provi-
sions.113 Those states that have separate articles governing nonprofits114 
are assured that such scrutiny will be applied, and not surprisingly, none 
of those states have enacted a director and officer liability statute similar 
to Maryland's Statute for nonprofits. That is not to suggest that Mary-
land should have a separate article governing nonprofits but rather that 
the legislature should not acquiesce in the application of a provision to a 
particular type of corporation unless it would pass that same provision 
specifically for that type of corporation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From analysis of the structure of its corporate law, it appears that 
Maryland's director's and officer's liability statute applies to nonprofit 
corporations as well as business corporations. Consequently, the officers 
and directors of charitable corporations have more potential shields 
against liability than any other corporate managers. Such a result is at 
odds with with persuasive arguments that officers and directors of non-
profits should be held to a higher standard of responsibility than officers 
empted from its application. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'N CoDE ANN. § 2-405.2(b) (Supp. 
1988). 
111. See id. § 1-102 (1985). 
112. See id. § 5-201. 
113. The Corporations and Associations article is designed economically so as not to 
repeat provisions needlessly. See Carter v. Glen Burnie Vol. Fire Co., 292 Md. 165, 
167, 438 A.2d 278, 279 (1981) (Subtitle 5 is designed to incorporate the Maryland 
General Corporation Law by reference rather than by repeating all the provisions). 
114. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989). 
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and directors of business corporations, and that the fiduciary duties of 
officers and directors of nonprofits should not be subject to diminish-
ment. If the contract theory of the corporation is the primary justifica-
tion for adopting this statute, the application of the statute to nonprofits 
is not justified, and the legislature should amend subtitle 5 of the Corpo-
rations and Associations article to exclude its application. 
Stewart P. Hoover 
